Introduction
The idea of we-thinking, or we-reasoning, is increasingly drawing the attention of more and more economists. In its general formulation, it has been proposed by David Hodgson (1967) , Donald Regan (1980) , Margaret Gilbert (1989) , Susan Hurley (1989) , Raimo Tuomela (1995) , and Martin Hollis (1998) . Within this body of literature, Robert Sugden (1993 Sugden ( , 2000 Sugden ( , 2003 and Michael Bacharach (1995 Bacharach ( , 1997 Bacharach ( , 1999 Bacharach ( , 2006 have developed analytical frameworks from an economic point of view. The main claim of scholars that analyze we-thinking is that it can be endorsed by people when they face a decision problem. In fact, experimental evidence shows that, especially in some kind of games, such as coordination games, people do endorse we-thinking .However, the way in which we-thinking arises and how it brings people to behave in a particular way in games is a matter that requires further investigation.
The two main contributors are Bacharach and Sugden, and they approach the topic in two dierent ways. Sugden's aim is to show that we-reasoning is 1 a consistent and logical way of thinking, but he does not face the problem of how we-reasoning can arise. He gives some intuitions only about a psychological background based on Smith's analysis of correspondence of sentiments.
Bacharach's theory is based on frames and his never reached aim (because of his death) was to explain we-thinking in terms of Variable Frame Theory (Bacharch 1993) . But, as we shall see later, some of his intuitions conict with the logical analysis he proposes. His logical analysis was developed by Tan (2003, 2008) : They introduce a`game harmony' measure, as a proxy of the extent of cooperation or conict in games. Game harmony could represent a step forward towards the endogenization of the probability that we-thinking could arise in a decision problem.
In the present paper, I take a dierent approach to the way in which we-thinking works. Based on a not fully developed intuition of Bacharach's, that does not entirely t into his logical analysis, i.e. the`double-crossing' problem in Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) game, I propose a framework in which a person is allowed to have both I-thoughts, when she is we-reasoning, and we-concepts, when she is I-reasoning, and develop my analysis in terms of equilibrium concepts. 2 Bacharach's theory of we-thinking
The answers to fundamental questions about coordination and cooperation. . . lie in the agent's conception not of the objects of choice, nor of the consequences, but of herself and of the agents with whom she is interacting(Bacharach, M., N. Gold and R. Sugden 2006, p. 70 ). This sentence is the starting point of Bacharach's analysis of we-reasoning. We-reasoning is
It is interesting to see how and when Bacharach developed the idea of we-thinking.
He started by building the Variable Frame theory (Bacharach 1993) , in parallel he was developing a theory of cooperation. In 1995 he introduced the category of`fellow member reasoner': Someone who is a member of a natural type T and chooses a certain strategy if she is suciently sure that her interactants are also member of T (-1995, p.1). In this context he tries to link T-membership to variable frame theory and, at for the rst time he introduces the`we' category: The present paper has made type T membership an issue which type T members think about, and nuanced their capacity to recognize
it. An alternative development would make T membership a variable element in players' frames in the sense of variable frame theory: that is, a player might or might not think about the game in terms of whether she and her coplayers belong to T. In the case in which T is the player set, we may put this by saying that a player may or may not think in`we' terms about how to play the game. The more inclined a player is to`we' thinking, and the more inclined she takes coplayers to be, the more will fellow-member reasoning be favoured (p.17 His theory is based on frames: if we-frame comes to mind, the subject will group identify and then she will start to we-reason. A frame can be dened as a set of concepts that an agent uses when she is thinking about a decision problem. It cannot be chosen, and how it comes to mind is a psychological process: Her frame stands to her thoughts as a set of axes does to a graph; it circumscribes the thoughts that are logically possible for her (not ever but at the time). In a decision problem, everything is up for framing. . . also up for framing are her coplayers, and herself . (ib. p. 69).
In Bacharach's framework, then, a person may start to we-reason only if she has`we' concepts in her frame: in other words, a person rstly recognizes the we-perspective, and then endorses it.
The`framing' perspective is not the only way in which the theory of we-thinking has been proposed, however. Robert Sugden, for example, has developed a dierent framework for looking at the problem. Sugden's framework can be summarized as in gure 1. assumes that a frame`we' can come to mind with a probability`M', which represents the probability for a subject to group-identify. The probability M is common knowledge # , in fact: in coming to frame a situation as a problem for us', an individual also gain some sense of how likely it is that another individual would frame it in the same way ( Trying to go deeper into the matter, Bacharach aims to explain how a frame, in particular a we-frame, may come to mind. In his earlier works (Bacharach, M. 1997 (Bacharach, M. , 1999 he proposes that the possibility of team reasoning is related to having`scope for cooperation' and to the`harmony of interests'.
In his last book he suggests the (strong) Interdependence Hypothesis, that roughly states: perceived interdependence prompts group identication.
The perception of interdependence between two agents in a game is given by three factors:
• common interest (the agents have common interest in s* over s, if both prefer s* to s, where s*, s are possible state of aairs, or, in a game, possible outcomes)
• copower (nobody can reach s* alone, but both can together)
• standard solution (basically Nash equilibrium that may realise s). We may summarize Bacharach' framework in the scheme in gure 2. could not complete the description of`we'-reasoning in terms of VFT. In fact, there are at least two problems to solve, in order to complete Bacharach's theory: one is related to the way he conceives the`we' frame, the other is the endogenization of M.
In Bacharach's circumspect team reasoning, as I have said before, if people group identify, then the we-frame comes to their mind and they start to we-reason. It seems as though in Bacharach's framing theory there are two aspects that are deeply linked: in framing a situation, the rst step is to recognize a frame, that is coming to see it; the second step is endorsing that frame, i.e. reasoning as the frame allows you to do. In Bacharach's theory group identication means not only endorsing a particular way of reasoning, but also coming to see it. The`compression' between the two aspects of framing is due to the VFT. In it in fact, changing frame does not mean to change the way of reasoning and the decision problem for a subject is fully determined by the interplay of his frame and the objective world.
$ See Bacharach 1993 , 2001 Because of this`compression', Bacharach in his theory of we-thinking cannot allow people to use more than one frame at a time. In a certain sense, as it has been noticed by Gold and Sugden (Bacharach, Gold and Sugden 2006 ), in we frame people become committed to we-reason: In the theory of team reasoning, an individual who reasons in the`we' frame is aware of the`I' frame too (as one of that other players might use) but acknowledge only`we' reasons. It seems that group identication involves something more that framing in the sense of variable frame theory: the group-identier does not merely become aware of group concepts, she also becomes committed to the priority of group concepts over individual ones (p.199).
The fact that people cannot use more that one frame at time and they cannot reason about frames whilst thinking of which frame to endorse, pre- Here Bacharach seems to have in mind some psychological process which inhibits group identity which is not quite represented by his own concept of interdependence the idea of`double-crossing'. The reason this idea doesn't t his framework is that double-crossing is the incentive to act on individual reasoning when one believe the other is acting on team reasoning. This requires that the player uses both frames at the same time, while thinking about which one to use. Or, in other words, a player, in order to recognize the`double-cross' threat, should be allowed to imagine himself in a we-frame, and then deliberating to cooperate, but at the same time he should use the I-frame by thinking that the other player would take advantage of her. In the rst player's conjecture, the other player too should use the we-frame in order to think that the rst player could choose to cooperate, and, at the same time, she should use I-frame in order to think how`double cross' the rst player.
In the theory of we-thinking the way in which a person reasons (I-mode or we-mode) is a consequence of the perceived frame. So, if a person is in we-frame she cannot reason in the standard theoretical mode, and then she cannot`see' the double-crossing threat. She may switch from I-mode of reasoning to we-reasoning (if we-frame comes to mind), or not. Bacharach, then, does not seem to take into account the possibility that once we are in the we-frame, we may switch to I-mode of reasoning, or better, he allows the possibility of switching frame, but does not allow a person to be able to visualize switching frames. And this is why he cannot represent his`doublecrossing' intuition. It seems that when the we frame is perceived, it is also perceived as the correct frame or dominant frame, so that once a person sees the world this way she cannot visualize going back to seeing it the other (compare illusions, myths, lies `the scales fell from my eyes').
In are non-integrable.`I' and`we' frames appear non integrable in Bacharach's words, and when this happens, the agent may nd herself vacillating between the judgments that she should do (ib.). In spite of these attempts, then,`double-cross' threat has not been enclosed in Bacharach's analytical framework.
I shall suggest later that it is possible to take into account what Bacharach called`personal' and`group' evaluation, by reasoning in terms of deviation from an equilibrium and not in terms of frames. Or better, it is possible to do that, if we separate the two aspects of framing: how a frame might come to mind and how people endorse a particular frame when she sees more than one frame. In this way it would become possible to represent double-cross intuition.
The second unsolved problem is the endogenization of M. Bacharach tries to endogenize M, because he sees that the fact that M is exogenous represents a lacuna in his theory. We may see a clear evolution in his thoughts along the years: in 1997 and 1999 papers he sees M as a function of the gain from cooperation and the harmony of interests: To endogenize M, and other feature of 9, one must show that the payos and other constitutive features of the basic game make collective identity salient or otherwise tend to induce team-thinking. The laboratory evidence is promising, as it suggests that group identication may be induced by the`common problem' mechanism'. or cooperation relative to theoretical predictions. In their framework, it is group identication that can explain excess in-group cooperation and excess out-group conict. They also believe that the so called`perceived harmony' can capture the eect of team reasoning on cooperation. This is a theoretical construct and it has not been tested yet. At the same time`perceived harmony' cannot be inferred by the payos of the game, because it is a sort of`experimental' measure (similarity index in experiments how subjects think a game is similar to a pure coordination game or to a zero-sum game -is a proxy for perceived harmony). Anyway, the simple game harmony First of all, I suppose that the group utility function of a combination of actions (a1, a2), when the players are P1 and P2, is U(a1, a2) = (u1(a1, a2) + u2(a1, a2))/2 % , where u1(a1, a2) and u2(a1, a2) are the player's payos.
A player who team reasons, rst computes which is the best prole for the group & , and then he does its part in it. A player who`I'-reasons follows the standard theoretic predictions of game theory.
It is possible to classify games in terms of reasoning on deviations. The basic idea is that a person may reason in the standard I-mode, or in we-mode, but she may have both frames (I and we) in mind (perhaps not at the same time, if the non-integrability hypothesis is correct, but vacillating between % This formulation is the most used one in literature. & The best prole is calculated allowing for`unreliable' contexts, and then taking into account the possibility that not everybody will group-indentify. them). In standard game theory an equilibrium is dened as a combination of actions in which no player has anything to gain by changing unilaterally her own strategy. In we-reasoning theory, an equilibrium is instead dened as a combination of actions in which the whole group cannot gain anything by switching from this combination to another. Deviation is seen then as a test for the existence of an equilibrium, no matter if I or we-equilibrium. In what follows, I shall simply test games in search for equilibria that hold from both I and we point of view. Take, for example, the game A (tab. 1). The combination of actions (H.L) is a Nash equilibrium. In it, in fact neither row player nor column player has reason to unilaterally deviate from that combination of actions. But the same combination is also a we-equilibrium: as a group both players cannot do anything better by switching to another combination ' . Game B shows a unique Nash equilibrium, (H,L) and two we-equilibria, (H,L) and (L,R), but only the (H,L) combination is an equilibrium at the same time for I and we-reasoners. Game C is an Hi-Lo game, and as it is well known, it has two Nash equilibria, i.e. (H,L) and (L,R), but only one we-equilibrium that is (H,L). ' The utility U for the group is 3 in (H,L) combination, 2.5 in both (H,R) and (L,L), and 2 in (L,R). Prisoner's Dilemma game, instead, has one Nash equilibrium (L,R) and one we-equilibrium (L,R), but they do not coincide.
If an equilibrium live through both, I and we, deviation tests, it is strong, in the sense that it allows for the existence of both ways of reasoning. At the same time such equilibrium could be seen as a renement when more than one equilibrium exists. In game B, for example, there are two we-equilibria, but if we allow players to see the game endorsing both I and we concepts, this could help them to recognize that (H,L) equilibrium is the prominent one, because it passes both deviation tests. In this case, having an I thought helps we-reasoners to select an equilibrium. But the opposite can happen as it is in the Hi-Lo game, where there are two Nash equilibria and we-thoughts can help I-reasoners to choose the (H,L) equilibrium.
The double test for deviation could also be seen in terms of deliberations, and not only as a method for testing the existence of an equilibrium. The scheme in g. n. 7 represents a possible way to classify the previous games in terms of deliberation. Take for example the game A: in this game, if I start to reason in the standard I-mode we, as a group will be happy with the result (H,L), i.e. we won't want to deviate jointly from the I-reasoning`solution'. On the opposite, if I group identify, and then I look for the best solution for the group, I as an individual will be happy with the result, i.e. I won't want to deviate unilaterally from the we-reasoning solution. So, in this game, the same result will be reached, independently of the particular way of reasoning. We may say that I or we-reasoning are observationally indierent because they give the same result in terms of choice. Looking at this game from Bacharach's perspective (at least my interpretation of it), I notice that this game does not possess the features that prompt we-reasoning (because the individual solution is not Pareto-dominated). This example illustrates how Bacharach's perspective does not appraise we solutions from the I perspective, but only the other way round. One may represent Bacharach's criterion as the answer to the following question: is there an I-solution which we are unhappy with? This will be represented by the lower part of the scheme (and in fact coordination games and prisoner's dilemma games are considered by Bacharach as games in which we-reasoning can arise).
But there could be dierent situations. Let us look at the game B: in this case, if I start with I-mode, there will be a unique Nash equilibrium (H,L), that is also one of the two possible (and indierent) we-solutions. If I start with I-mode, we shall then be happy with the result. But, if we group identify and we-reason, if we-reasoning gets us to (H, L), I am happy. If it gets us to (L, R), I am unhappy. So the end of the story is the outcome (H, L), either by we-reasoning or by I-reasoning. This result is observationally equivalent to I-reasoning but not to we-reasoning, because the latter allows (L, R). For the same reasons as before, the game B belongs to the border line in Bacharach's view (I and we solution are the same in terms of payo).
Game C, instead (the Hi-Lo game), will prompt we-reasoning: if I start with I-mode we won't be happy, because I cannot choose between the two NE, only one of which is also a we-solution; but if we group identify I will be happy with the result.
The last game, the Prisoner's Dilemma game, is the most interesting: if I start with I-reasoning, we won't be happy (the NE is Pareto-dominated by the we solution). But if we group identify the we solution is not good for me (I would be better o by playing the other strategy). In this case there can be a continuous switching from a frame to another. In fact, in the experiment on the PD game, we observe a rate of cooperation of about 50% (see Sally 1995) . Following Bacharach's theory, the PD, as we have seen, is the typical game that can lead to we-reason, by prompting the`interdependence hypothesis'. In the framework I have presented, instead, the`double-cross' intuition is taken into account, and this generate a perpetual shift, and then we-reasoning is only one of the two equally possible solutions. It is plausible that in cases like this, the salience of frames will play a key-role in the selection of the solution of the game.
This way of looking at a decision problem does not tell us which frame is more likely to appear. But, if a frame comes to mind, within this classication, we may see, depending on the kind of game the subject is facing, if the frame will be stable or not. However,`being happy with the results' sometimes depends on which solution is selected. In game B, starting with WE, I may or may not be happy. In game C, starting with I, WE may or may not be happy. We must read, then, the line`yes' in the classication of g. 3, as the situation in which agents are not willing to deviate whatever solution will be selected. Game A does not t the interdependence hypothesis, and then, in Bacharach's framework it prompts I-reasoning. It has a negative harmony, and then in Tan and Zizzo's framework it is seen as a conictual game. In my framework, both I and we-reasoning are possible and both of them lead to the same solution of the game. Game B, instead, belongs to the borderline in terms of interdependence, because the I solution of the game is not strictly Pareto-dominated, but equal to the we-solution. It is seen as conictual game in terms of harmony and the prevailing way of reasoning it prompts is I. Game C, the Hi-lo game has the same prediction from every point of view. In contrast, the PD game could bring an agent to team reason by following Bacharach; it is conictual in terms of game harmony (and then does not lead to cooperative option); and it can lead to a perpetual shift in term of reasoning, from my point of view.
Games A and D have the same harmony (-0.8), but they are dierent in terms of thinking about deviations (yes/yes for A and no/no for D). At the same time, by slightly changing the payos of Game A, harmony will change but not the way of reasoning. The game in table 6 belongs to category A (yes/yes) but now the game harmony has become positive: it is 0.2. Then, the I-solution (Nash equilibrium) remains the same, like the we-solution. But game harmony switches from a negative value to a positive one, that is from conictual to cooperative prediction. By adding row T and column S to game B (as in tab. 7), the way of reasoning does not change, but harmony does change: from 1 to -0,7. The way of reasoning does not change because the added row and column are dominated from both, I and we point of view. Similarly, by adding row T and column S to the game C (Hi-Lo game, as in tab. 8), it remains the same type of game in terms of way of reasoning (no/yes), but harmony changes (it becomes 0,16, instead of 1). The previous examples tell us that perhaps game harmony measure needs 15 to be rened. Or better, game harmony is not a strategic way to look at a game, and then we cannot ask to this measure to embody strategic reason. And in some way this measure does respect Bacharach's approach to frames. In fact, in Bacharach's analysis coming to see a frame is a matter of salience, and games with a high game harmony do make we-solution, and then weframe more salient. However, in some ways game harmony measure and my proposal are linked. In fact, a step forward towards a theory of choice that takes in account both I and we modes of reasoning might be a comparison between incentives to deviate from an equilibrium. Take for example the following games (table 9) , that represent PD games with increasingly`game harmony' measures. Table 9 : games with increasing degrees of harmony
The incentive for deviating from a we-equilibrium is measured as the dierence between the payo in (L,L) and the one in (H,L) for the row player It means 2 for the rst game, the less harmonious, 1 for the second and 0.1 for the third, the most harmonious. In the third game, thus, wereasoning is more likely to appear than in the rst one. Although further investigation is needed, this seems to be a promising approach to we-thinking theory and more in general to decision theory. The game is symmetric and then the result will be the same if we calculate the incentive for the column player. 16 
Conclusions
In this paper I have analysed Bacharach's theory of we-thinking. In particular I focused on his attempt to formalize we-thinking in terms of Variable Frame theory. I found that two main problems arise trying to do it. One is linked to the endogenization of M, the probability that a person may groupidentify in a determinate situation. The other one is the impossibility, in Bacharach's framework, to use more than one frame at the same time. This problem prevents Bacharach from representing his`double-crossing' intuition in the Prisoner Dilemma game, because it requires an agent to have I-frame in mind when he is we-thinking. I have proposed a way in which the`doublecross' intuition may be taken into account: reasoning about deviation from equilibrium, where equilibrium is seen both from an I and from a we point of view. This requires that an agent might reason using more than one frame at time, and it is not a psychological theory. What I have presented it is only a rst step based on an equilibrium concept. Steps forward might be to verify if people really endorse this way of reasoning, and to formalize what happens if some people group-identify and some others do not in this framework, that is, to allow for the existence of unreliable contexts.
